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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout American history, farmers have played a vital role 
in American society and the construction of its economy. This 
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fundamental fact remains true today. In 2013, the meat and poultry 
packing industry in the United States employed more than 482,100 
workers (with combined salaries of more than $19 billion) and 
produced approximately 93.5 billion pounds of meat for consumers 
around the world.1 Sales of this meat totaled $198 billion, and, when 
taking into account the meat and poultry packing industry’s 
suppliers, distributors, retailers, and ancillary industries, “[t]he meat 
and poultry industry’s economic ripple effect generates $864.2 
billion annually to the U.S. economy, or roughly 6% of the entire 
[gross domestic product].”2 Moreover, the contributions of 
American livestock and poultry farmers and the meat packing 
industry in the United States extend far beyond mere economic 
considerations. The estimated global population has increased from 
approximately 3.5 billion in 1967 to approximately 7.5 billion today.3 
This population increase is expected to continue exponentially, with 
the global population expected to reach 8.5 billion people by the 
year 2030 and 11.2 billion people by the year 2100.4 Although 
America’s livestock and poultry farmers and the meat packing 
industry have achieved amazing production efficiencies, even 
greater advances in efficiency and production will be necessary in 
order to continue to feed the ever-increasing global population. 
However, despite the tremendous innovations and successes of 
American agriculture over the past several years, farmers are now 
under siege on multiple fronts. In order to raise funds to advance 
their political agenda, environmental and animal rights activists use 
isolated incidents and edited videos to falsely accuse livestock and 
poultry farmers of destroying the quality of air and water and of 
abusing animals. These attacks have led to unprecedented increases 
in the scope of governmental regulation of agricultural practices, 
including, perhaps most prominently in the eyes of the general 
public, various types of environmental regulations.5  
1. The United States Meat Industry at a Glance, N. AM. MEAT INST.,
https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.php?ht=d/sp/i/47465/pid/47465 (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
2. Id.
3. See Human Population: Population Growth, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU,
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Lesson-Plans/HumanPopulation 
/PopulationGrowth.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
4. World Population Projected to Reach 9.7 Billion by 2050, U.N. DEP’T OF ECON.
AND SOC. AFF. (July 29, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news 
/population/2015-report.html. 
5. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012); Clean Air Act, 42
2
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This article focuses on one particular piece of federal legislation 
and its accompanying regulations that may be less prominent in the 
public realm but have been a significant part of the meat packing 
industry for nearly one hundred years: the Packers and Stockyards 
Act (the “PSA” or the “Act”).6 The PSA was enacted on August 15, 
1921,7 and, as discussed in greater detail throughout this article, 
exists “to insure effective competition and integrity in livestock, 
meat, and poultry markets.”8 This purpose is currently pursued by 
the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration 
(“GIPSA”), which assumed responsibility for administering the Act 
in 1994.9 In 2010, however, GIPSA proposed various rules and 
regulations10 that quickly became the source of great controversy 
within the meat and poultry industry.11 While many of these rules 
did not ultimately take effect at the time,12 GIPSA recently revived 
several of these regulations through new interim and proposed 
regulations.13 
More specifically, this article analyzes some of GIPSA’s more 
controversial rules in light of the PSA as it has existed, been altered, 
and been interpreted over the past ninety-five years. Part II provides 
the necessary background for this analysis, discussing both the 
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012). 
6. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181–229 (2012).
7. Id. § 181.
8. The Packers and Stockyards Act: An Overview, THE NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR.,
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/packers-and-stockyards/ (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2017). 
9. Christopher R. Kelley, An Overview of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 2003 ARK.
L. NOTES 35, 36 (2003). Prior to 1994, the Act was administered by the Packers and 
Stockyards Administration. Id. 
10. See Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food,
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008; Conduct in Violation of the Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 
35,338 (June 22, 2010) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
11. See Shauna R. Hermel, Alert: GIPSA Livestock Marketing Rule, ANGUS BEEF
BULL. (July 20, 2010), http://www.angusbeefbulletin.com/extra/2010/07jul10 
/0710mk_gipsa_rule.html (summarizing the views of industry organizations with 
regard to the proposed 2010 GIPSA rules). 
12. See generally JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41673, USDA’S 
“GIPSA RULE” ON LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY MARKETING PRACTICES (2015) (discussing 
the rulemaking history of GIPSA’s proposed rules and how subsequent GIPSA riders 
prevented enactment of certain aspects of those proposed rules). 
13. Scope of Sections 202(a) and (b) of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 81
Fed. Reg. 92,566 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201); Unfair Practices 
and Undue Preferences in Violation of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 
92,703 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
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history of the PSA as originally enacted and portions of the Act that 
are invoked on a regular basis.14 Part III then focuses on a more 
recent piece of legislation—the 2008 Farm Bill—and GIPSA’s 
attempt to exercise its rulemaking authority under that legislation to 
dramatically change the landscape of the PSA.15 Next, Part IV argues 
that GIPSA goes too far in these attempts, thereby effectively 
rewriting the PSA to increase the scope of its regulatory authority.16 
In particular, this article asserts that GIPSA’s efforts are inconsistent 
with the purpose of the PSA, both as originally enacted and as 
interpreted over the past ninety-five years.17 
II. THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The PSA was originally enacted “[t]o regulate interstate and
foreign commerce in livestock, live-stock products, dairy products, 
poultry, poultry products, and eggs, and for other purposes.”18 
Section A of this Part discusses that purpose in light of the meat 
packing industry at the time the PSA was enacted.19 Section B then 
discusses the general statutory structure of the PSA.20 
A. The Historical Backdrop of the PSA
The early-1900s meat packing industry was markedly different 
than the industry today. At that time, the chain of commerce in the 
industry was connected through various forms of infrastructure, 
including the railroads; stock cars and refrigerator cars; and freight 
depots and stockyards, where livestock was ultimately sold to 
packers.21 Individual producers, who might have raised livestock in 
any part of the country (although most frequently in the ranges in 
the western United States), were dependent upon this 
infrastructure.22 For example, a farmer or rancher may load his 
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Parts III–IV.
18. Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159.
19. See infra Section I.A.
20. See infra Section I.B.
21. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE
MEAT-PACKING INDUSTRY 25, 40 (1919). 
22. See Louise Carroll Wade, Meatpacking, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI.,
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/804.html (last visited Feb. 25, 
2017). 
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animals on a freight car bound for distant stockyards or processing 
plants without ever directly dealing with or visiting those facilities. As 
a result of these market dynamics and the sheer distance separating 
most farmers and packing plants, the integrity and propriety of this 
chain of commerce was a great concern.23 Additionally, the 
sanitation and working conditions of packing plants at the turn of 
the twentieth century24 became a great concern that led to 
legislation.25 
Suspecting antitrust law violations within the meat packing 
industry, in 1917, the President of the United States directed the 
Federal Trade Commission to investigate that industry’s practices.26 
Over the next year, such an investigation took place, resulting in a 
six-volume report that confirmed the existence of “monopolies, 
controls, trusts, combinations, conspiracies, or restraints of trade out 
of harmony with the law and the public interest” in the meat packing 
industry.27 Specifically, the report found the meat packing industry 
was dominated by five companies: Swift & Company, Armour & 
Company, Morris & Company, Cudahy Packing Company, and 
Wilson & Company.28 Discussing these five companies, the report 
stated: 
As we have followed these five great corporations through 
their amazing and devious ramifications—followed them 
through important branches of industry, of commerce, and 
of finance—we have been able to trace back to its source 
the great power which has made possible their growth. We 
have found that it is not so much the means of production 
and preparation, nor the sheer momentum of great wealth, 
but the advantage which is obtained through a 
monopolistic control of the market places and means of 
transportation and distribution.29 
Specifically, the Federal Trade Commission found that Swift, 
Armour, Morris, Cudahy, and Wilson used their ownership of 
packing houses, control over channels of distribution (including 
stockyards, private car lines, cold storage plants, and branch houses), 
23. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 25, 40.
24. See generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
25. See, e.g., Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1907).
26. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 23.
27. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 24.
5
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and control over distributive machinery to “[m]anipulate live-stock 
markets; [r]estrict interstate and international supplies of foods; 
[c]ontrol the prices of dressed meats and other foods; [d]efraud 
both the producers of food and consumers; [c]rush effective 
competition; [s]ecure special privileges from railroads, stockyard 
companies, and municipalities; and [p]rofiteer.”30 
Although Congress rejected the Federal Trade Commission’s 
suggestion that the federal government take ownership of stockyards 
and other related facilities,31 Congress did respond to the findings 
in the report by enacting the PSA.32 
The legislative history of the PSA suggests varying accounts of 
the Act’s original, basic purpose, and two fields of thought have 
emerged as to what that purpose is.33 The first, which has been 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court for the entire history 
of the Act, supports the assertion that “the PSA is one of several 
antitrust statutes intended to protect competition in order to protect 
consumers from high prices.”34 This view is bolstered by the notion 
that the PSA has common heritage and shares intellectual, political, 
and legal history with the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Federal 
Trade Commission Act—other antitrust statutes that focus on 
promoting market efficiency and consumer welfare.35 
30. Id.
31. Kelley, supra note 9, at 37.
32. Id.
33. See John D. Shively & Jeffrey S. Roberts, Competition Under the Packers and
Stockyards Act: What Now?, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 419, 431 (2010). 
34. Id. (citing Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 591 F.3d 355, 370 (5th Cir.
2009) (en banc) (Jones, C.J., concurring)). 
35. Id. at 431–32. The legislative history bolstering this view was thoroughly
discussed by the concurring opinion filed in Wheeler. 591 F.3d at 369–70. Such 
history includes the report of the House Committee on Agriculture (H.R. Rep. No. 
67-77, at 2–10 (1921)), which focused on the Supreme Court’s competition 
jurisprudence developed with regard to the Interstate Commerce Act and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act when discussing the PSA’s meatpacker provisions; 
the House Committee on Agriculture’s May 2, 1921, Hearing on Meat Packers, 
which discussed the prevention of packers from “combination, apportionment of 
territory and of markets, as well as the oppression of competitors” as the call for the 
PSA; and statements by supporters of the PSA (Committee on Agriculture of the House 
of Representatives, Hearing on Meat Packers, May 2, 1921, at 54 (statement of National 
League of Women Voters); H.R. Rep. No. 85-1048, at 1 (1957)), which asserted that 
the Act would ultimately aid farmers and growers and reduce the price of food for 
consumers. 
6
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The second field of thought, which is advanced by GIPSA, is far 
broader and asserts that “the PSA is a market regulatory statute 
intended to protect producers from low prices, and it might well be 
more restrictive than antitrust statutes, which ‘protect[] . . . 
competition, not competitors.’”36 This view is bolstered by “ever-
increasing concentration and vertical integration of beef and pork 
packers and poultry processors, which [some] assert increases the 
market power and injustices the PSA was intended to prevent.”37 This 
distinction forms a significant theoretical rift when discussing 
GIPSA’s current rules.38 
The year that Congress enacted the PSA, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the constitutionality of the Act in Stafford v. Wallace.39 In 
Stafford, the Court held that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause, as the activities falling within 
the purview of the Act burdened the freedom of interstate 
commerce and the stockyard business was an essential part of 
interstate commerce.40 Thus, Stafford was the first indication of the 
36. Shively & Roberts, supra note 33, at 431. Pieces of legislative history
bolstering this view were also discussed in Wheeler via the dissent. 591 F.3d at 378–79 
(Garza, J., dissenting). The dissent quotes at length from H.R. No. 85-1048, 
emphasizing the following language:  
The primary purpose of this Act is to assure fair competition and fair 
trade practices in livestock marketing and in the meatpacking 
industry. The objective is to safeguard farmers and ranchers against 
receiving less than the true market value of their livestock and to protect 
consumers against unfair business practices in the marketing of meats, 
poultry, etc. Protection is also provided to members of the livestock 
marketing and meat industries from unfair, deceptive, unjustly 
discriminatory, and monopolistic practices of competitors, large or small  
. . . . 
The act provides that meatpackers subject to its provisions shall not 
engage in practices that restrain commerce or create monopoly. They 
are prohibited from buying or selling any article for the purpose of or 
with the effect of manipulating or controlling prices in commerce. They 
are also prohibited from engaging in any unfair, deceptive, or unjustly 
discriminatory practice or device in the conduct of their business, or 
conspiring, combining, agreeing, or arranging with other persons to do 
any of these acts.  
Id. at 378 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85-1048 at 1–2). 
37. Shively & Roberts, supra note 33, at 432.
38. See infra Part IV.
39. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
40. Id. at 528 (“As already noted, the word ‘commerce,’ when used in the [A]ct,
is defined to be interstate and foreign commerce. Its provisions are carefully drawn 
7
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PSA’s staying power and allowed enforcement of the Act to 
commence. 
B. A General Overview of the PSA 
The PSA provides a comprehensive approach to the meat and 
poultry packing industry. The Act itself contains four subchapters: a 
subchapter providing general definitions;41 a subchapter addressing 
packers;42 a subchapter addressing stockyards and stockyard 
dealers;43 and a subchapter addressing general and administrative 
matters.44 The scope of the Act can be ascertained through the 
definitions of the entities it covers: packers,45 stockyards,46 and 
stockyard dealers.47 Although these terms’ definitions generally 
pertain to “livestock,”48 various other specific provisions of the PSA 
also regulate “poultry.”49 
The Act imposes various types of obligations, some specific and 
some general, on the above entities.50 For example, the Act 
to apply only to those practices and obstructions which in the judgment of Congress 
are likely to affect interstate commerce prejudicially. Thus construed and applied, 
we think the [A]ct clearly within Congressional power and valid.”). 
41. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181–83 (2012).
42. Id. §§ 191–98b.
43. Id. §§ 201–17a.
44. Id. §§ 221–29c.
45. Id. § 191 (“[A]ny person engaged in the business (a) of buying livestock in
commerce for purposes of slaughter, or (b) of manufacturing or preparing meats 
or meat food products for sale or shipment in commerce, or (c) of marketing meats, 
meat food products, or livestock products in an unmanufactured form acting as a 
wholesale broker, dealer, or distributor in commerce.”). 
46. Id. § 202(a) (“[A]ny place, establishment, or facility commonly known as
stockyards, conducted, operated, or managed for profit or nonprofit as a public 
market for livestock producers, feeders, market agencies, and buyers, consisting of 
pens, or other enclosures, and their appurtenances, in which live cattle, sheep, 
swine, horses, mules, or goats are received, held, or kept for sale or shipment in 
commerce.”). 
47. Id. § 201(d) (“[A]ny person, not a market agency, engaged in the business
of buying or selling in commerce livestock, either on his own account or as the 
employee or agent of the vendor or purchaser.”). 
48. Id. § 182(4) (defining livestock as “cattle, sheep, swine, horses, mules, or
goats”). 
49. Live poultry dealers are, for example, barred from engaging in unfair,
unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practices. See id. § 192(a); see also id. § 182(6) 
(defining poultry as “chickens, turkeys, ducks, geese, and other domestic fowl”). 
50. For a detailed discussion of many of the obligations imposed by the Act (as
in effect in 2003), see Kelley, supra note 9, at 40–56. 
8
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empowers the Secretary of Agriculture to require that packers be 
bonded if their annual purchases exceed $500,000,51 imposes 
statutory trusts on livestock and poultry (and meat derived 
therefrom) purchased by packers,52 and requires prompt payments 
from packers to protect livestock and poultry farmers and ranchers.53 
Also, stockyards must furnish (and only furnish) “reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory” services,54 charge reasonable rates for services,55 
be managed in a way that insures a competitive market,56 keep 
adequate accounts and records,57 and comply with the Secretary of 
Agriculture’s orders.58 
Despite the specific requirements discussed above, the core of 
the PSA is a broad, general prohibition against unfair trade practices 
by packers, stockyards, and dealers.59 Specifically, the Act provides:  
It shall be unlawful for any packer or swine contractor with 
respect to livestock, meats, meat food products, or livestock 
products in unmanufactured form, or for any live poultry 
dealer with respect to live poultry, to: 
(a) Engage in or use any unfair, unjustly 
discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device; or 
(b) Make or give any undue or unreasonable 
preference or advantage to any particular person or 
locality in any respect, or subject any particular person 
or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or 
disadvantage in any respect . . . .60 
A significant legal debate centers on the scope of the broad 
prohibitions against “unfair” and “unjustly discriminatory” practices 
and “undue or unreasonable preference[s]” in parts (a) and (b) of 
this statute.61 Specifically, that debate centers on whether it is 
necessary for claimants alleging a violation of section 192(a) or (b) 
of the PSA to show proof of actual or likely harm to competition in 
51. 7 U.S.C. § 204.
52. Id. § 196(b).
53. Id. § 228b(a).
54. Id. § 205.
55. Id. § 206.
56. Id. § 208(b).
57. Id. § 221.
58. Id. §§ 211–13.
59. Id. § 192.
60. Id.
61. See generally Shively & Roberts, supra note 33. Sections 192(a) and (b) have
remained “relatively unchanged” since the PSA was originally enacted. Id. at 424. 
9
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the overall market rather than mere harm to the individual 
claimant.62 Both sides of this debate acknowledge that the PSA does 
not expressly address this issue.63 Those that oppose a competitive 
harm requirement believe the absence of express language is 
conclusive. On the other hand, others recognize the terms “unfair,” 
“unjust,” and “undue or unreasonable” as legal terms of art in the 
antitrust context that themselves require a showing of competitive 
harm.64 But, as discussed more fully below, despite this ongoing 
debate, the federal appellate courts that have faced this issue have 
universally recognized a requirement of competitive harm (or likely 
competitive harm) under sections 192(a) and 192(b) of the PSA.65 
Many of the early cases applying the PSA come from the Seventh 
Circuit, which was the home of many of the large packers that 
motivated the enactment of the PSA. In 1939, the Seventh Circuit 
considered an order of the Secretary of Agriculture prohibiting 
preferential discounts to some (but not all) customers of a packer.66 
In reversing this order, the Seventh Circuit held that the Secretary 
was required to consider the effect of the disparate treatment on 
competition before finding a violation of the PSA.67 
Approximately twenty years later, the Seventh Circuit 
considered an order of the Secretary of Agriculture arising from two 
alleged violations of the PSA: (1) an agreement between a packer 
and a competitive dealer to refrain from competitive bidding for top-
grade hogs at a specific market and to share the hogs between them, 
62. See Rachael L. Dettmann, Note, You’re Not the Boss of Me: An Analysis of
GIPSA’s Authority to Regulate Private Contracting in the Beef Industry, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 321, 325 (2011). 
63. See generally id.
64. Id. at 326–27.
65. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have implemented the idea of competitive harm when analyzing claims 
under section 192(a) or (b), and the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
each held that a claimant cannot prevail under section 192(a) or (b) without 
demonstrating competitive harm. See generally Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 
272 (6th Cir. 2010); Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride, 591 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2009); Been 
v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2007); London v. Fieldale Farms Corp.,
410 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2005); Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 420 F.3d 1272 
(11th Cir. 2005); IBP, Inc. v. Glickman, 187 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 1999); Philson v. 
Goldsboro Milling Co., 164 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 1998); De Jong Packing Co. v. USDA, 
618 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1980); Armor & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 
1968). 
66. Swift & Co. v. Wallace, 105 F.2d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 1939).
67. Id. at 854.
10
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and (2) a practice by the packer of quoting prices to dealers before 
the dealers purchased hogs (and honoring the quoted price even if 
the market changed in the interim).68 The court held that “the 
agreement between competitive buyers to split or share the purchase 
of top grade hogs” violated the PSA because “[t]he essential nature 
and the necessary result of this arrangement or practice was to 
eliminate competition.”69 On the other hand, the court held that the 
mere “dissemination of price information to country dealers is not 
illegal per se” under the PSA, but “is illegal only if made ‘for the 
purpose of restricting or limiting competition, manipulating 
livestock prices or controlling the movement of livestock.’”70 
A few years later, in considering whether a packer’s short-term 
coupon program for a particular type of bacon violated the PSA, the 
Seventh Circuit reiterated its conclusion, based on the legislative 
history of and case law interpreting the PSA, that a violation of 
section 192(a) requires either “some predatory intent or some 
likelihood of competitive injury.”71 As the court further expounded: 
When viewed together, the antitrust laws, although not 
completely harmonious and frequently overlapping, 
express a basic public policy distinguishing between fair 
and vigorous competition on the one hand and predatory 
or controlled competition on the other. Normally the twin 
solvents for determining when the boundaries of fair 
competition have been exceeded are the existence of 
predatory intent and the likelihood of injury to 
competition. The clearer the danger of the latter, as when 
competitors conspire to eliminate the uncertainties of 
price competition, the less important is proof of the 
former. Conversely, the likelihood of injury arising from 
conduct adopted with predatory purpose is so great as to 
require little or no showing that such injury has already 
taken place. Each statutory prohibition of specified acts or 
practices reflects the Congressional conclusions as to the 
gravity of the injury to be feared and the relative difficulty 
of distinguishing honest competition and predation. The 
fact that a given provision does not expressly specify the 
degree of injury or the type of intent required, does not 
imply that these basic indicators of the line between free 
68. Swift & Co. v. United States, 308 F.2d 849, 852–54 (7th Cir. 1962).
69. Id. at 853.
70. Id. at 854.
71. Armour & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1968).
11
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competition and predation are to be ignored. Surely words 
such as “unfair” and “unjustly” in Section 202(a) and 
“undue” and “unreasonable” in Section 202(b) require 
some examination of the seller’s intent and the likely 
effects of its acts or practices under scrutiny, even though 
these tests under Section 202(a) and (b) be less stringent 
than under some of the anti-trust laws. These adjectival 
qualifications expressed in the statutory language enjoin 
the Department and courts to apply a rule of reason in 
determining the lawfulness of a particular practice under 
Section 202(a) and (b).72 
Other circuits have also consistently reached the same result. In 
Farrow v. United States Department of Agriculture, for example, the 
Eighth Circuit recognized that a practice is “unfair” under the PSA 
“if it injures or is likely to injure competition.”73 Relying on “the 
backdrop of corruption the [PSA] was intended to prevent” and “the 
PSA’s antitrust ancestry,” the Eleventh Circuit joined several of its 
sister circuits in 2005 and expressly held “that in order to prevail 
under the PSA, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s deceptive 
or unfair practice adversely affects competition or is likely to 
adversely affect competition.”74 The Tenth Circuit joined this 
growing group two years later and held that a violation of section 
192(a) of the PSA requires proof “that the [challenged] practice 
injures or is likely to injure competition.”75 
The most thorough analysis of this issue, however, is in the Fifth 
Circuit’s en banc decision in Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride.76 In Wheeler, the 
plaintiffs were chicken growers who alleged that the defendant gave 
a non-party grower more preferable terms than those given to the 
plaintiffs.77 The plaintiffs argued that this preferential treatment 
constituted “‘deceptive, unlawful, unfair, capricious, arbitrary, and 
discriminatory’ conduct in violation of § 192(a) and (b).”78 A 
majority of the Fifth Circuit disagreed because the plaintiffs had not 
demonstrated an “injury, or likelihood of injury, to competition”—a 
72. Id.
73. 760 F.2d 211, 214 (8th Cir. 1985).
74. Londale v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 410 F.3d 1295, 1302–05 (11th Cir. 2005).
75. Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 1217, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007).
76. 591 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
77. Id. at 357.
78. Id.
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necessity, according to the majority, for a claim brought under 
section 192(a) or (b).79 
In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied on several 
justifications. First, the majority found that “[t]he anti-competitive 
behaviors of the big meat packing companies of the 1920s motivated 
Congress to pass the Act, and the Supreme Court in Stafford v. Wallace 
concluded that the Act was constitutional because of the anti-
competitive concerns of Congress.”80 Second, the majority found 
that “[i]t [was] reasonable to conclude that Congress accepts the 
meaning of § 192(a) to require an effect on competition to be 
actionable because congressional silence in response to circuit 
unanimity ‘after years of judicial interpretation supports adherence 
to the traditional view.’”81 Finally, the majority noted that the 
requirement of competitive harm promotes predictability.82 
Requiring this showing of competitive harm under section 192(a) or 
(b) is predictable, given judicial precedent requiring the same.83 A 
significant concurring opinion, joined by several of the judges in the 
majority, further clarified that the requirement of competitive harm 
is consistent with the plain language of the statute.84 The 
concurrence reasoned that key statutory terms had become legal 
terms of art with clear, recognized meanings, which included 
competitive harm, by the time the PSA was enacted.85 
Several Fifth Circuit judges dissented, concluding that a claim 
brought under section 192(a) or (b) should not require a showing 
of competitive harm.86 The dissent focused mainly on the language 
of section 192 as a whole, stating: 
The plain language of the PSA, however, is clear. Some 
subsections contain “restraining commerce” language 
[subsections 192(c), (d), and (e)] and some do not 
[subsections 192(a) and 192(b)]. We have to give effect to 
79. Id. at 363.
80. Id. at 362.
81. Id. at 361–62 (quoting General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S.
581, 593–94 (2004)). The majority noted that “after 1921 and up to 2002, Congress 
has amended § 192 seven times without making any changes that would affect the 
many court interpretations” imposing a competitive harm requirement, 
notwithstanding judicial history requiring a showing of competitive harm. Id. at 361. 
82. Id. at 363.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 364–71 (Jones, J. concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 372 (Garza, J., dissenting).
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this difference. . . . The most natural reading is that those 
subsections with the “restraining commerce” language 
require a competitive injury and those without it do not. 
Because the majority’s construction of the PSA avoids this 
straightforward conclusion only by reading absent terms 
into the statute, it should be rejected.87 
In sum, the trend in favor of requiring a showing of competitive 
harm as an element of section 192(a) or (b) is strong, despite 
advocacy of arguments to the contrary. There is little indication at 
this point that the trend will cease within the judiciary without 
further action by other governmental entities. 
III. EXPANSION OF THE PSA THROUGH THE 2008 FARM BILL
One of the ways in which the PSA has been amended or 
impacted is through the passage of “farm bills.” The term “farm bill” 
refers to an omnibus bill concerning a wide variety of topics, 
including agriculture, conservation, and food assistance.88 The first 
farm bill, titled the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933, was passed 
to combat the effects of the Great Depression.89 The Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 set the stage for similar legislation, which is 
still drafted and enacted periodically today; the most recent farm bill 
was passed three years ago and is entitled the Agricultural Act of 
2014.90 
Since the adoption of the PSA and the enactment of the first 
farm bill, livestock and poultry farming has undergone significant 
economic changes. Specifically, consolidation has produced larger 
farming operations that are owned by fewer farmers.91 Many of these 
larger operations (particularly in swine and poultry) have vertically 
integrated their operations.92 They now use contract-grower 
87. Id. at 377.
88. A Short History and Summary of the Farm Bill, FARM POLICY FACTS,
https://www.farmpolicyfacts.org/farm-policy-history/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
89. Id.
90. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649. For
a full list of, and links to, farm bills enacted since 1933, see United States Farm Bills, 
NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/ (last visited Feb. 
22, 2017). 
91. JAMES M. MACDONALD ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
ERR-152, FARM SIZE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF U.S. CROP FARMING 15 (Aug. 2013), 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/45108/39359_err152.pdf. 
92. CLEMENT E. WARD, VERTICAL INTEGRATION COMPARISON: BEEF, PORK, AND
POULTRY (1997). 
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agreements under which smaller farmers contract to provide the 
facilities and labor to care for animals that are owned (and eventually 
marketed) by the larger integrator.93 Although these larger, 
integrated farming operations have been decried by some as 
“corporate farming,” these arrangements can provide significant 
benefits to the contract growers by providing consistent, guaranteed 
income that is not dependent on highly volatile market prices or 
significant disease risks.94 These practices also benefit consumers 
because they ensure consistent supply and quality of meat products 
and reduce prices through improved efficiency.95 
The farm bill passed in 2008, which is over five hundred pages 
in length and entitled the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act (the 
“2008 Farm Bill” or the “Bill”), made various modifications to the 
PSA.96 In particular, the 2008 Farm Bill added new provisions that 
regulated the contractual relationships between larger, integrated 
farmers and contract growers in swine and poultry.97 This 
development is a marked expansion of the historical scope of the 
PSA, which had never before regulated the economic activities of 
farmers; it had regulated only packers, stockyards, and dealers.98 The 
2008 Farm Bill also directed the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) to adopt regulations on certain specific topics.99 
These changes are more fully discussed below. 
93. Id.
94. Phillip L. Kunkel & Jeffrey A. Peterson, Agricultural Production Contracts, U.
MINN. EXTENSION 1, 1–2 (June 2015), https://www.extension.umn.edu/agriculture 
/business/taxation/farm-legal-series/agricultural-production-contracts/docs 
/agricultural-production-contracts.pdf (“Such contracts may provide for a more 
stable income for the producer by reducing traditional marketing risks. . . . An 
agricultural production contract may provide the producer with a guaranteed 
market . . . .”). 
95. Nathan Wittmaack, Should Corporate Farming Be Limited in the United States?:
An Economic Perspective, 8 MAJOR THEMES ECON. 45, 54 (2006) (discussing how the 
“corporate farming” style creates efficiency gains that are passed on to the 
consumer). 
96. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat.
923. 
97. Id. § 208 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 197a (2012)).
98. See generally Kelley, supra note 9 (describing what the PSA regulated prior
to the 2008 Farm Bill). 
99. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act § 11006.
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A. An Increase in Benefits to Growers and Producers 
Section 11005 of the 2008 Farm Bill added sections 197a, 197b, 
and 197c to the PSA, which deal with production contracts, choice 
of law and venue, and arbitration, respectively.100 Each of these new 
provisions increases (or, at least, attempts to increase) the benefits 
or protections afforded to contract growers.101 
First, the 2008 Farm Bill granted poultry growers and swine 
production contract growers the right to cancel a growing or 
production contract within three business days of the contract’s 
execution or by a contractually specified cancellation date.102 The 
contract itself must “clearly disclose” these cancellation rights, as well 
as the method of cancellation.103 The contract must also 
“conspicuously state,” on the contract’s first page, that “additional 
large capital investments may be required of the poultry grower or 
swine production contract grower during the term of the poultry 
growing arrangement or swine production contract,” if such 
investments may, in fact, be required.104 
Second, with regard to choice-of-law and venue,105 the 2008 
Farm Bill mandated that the proper forum in which a contract 
dispute between the parties to a poultry growing arrangement or 
swine production or marketing contract is the federal judicial district 
in which principle performance is set to take place.106 Additionally, 
the Bill allows the contract to specify which state’s law applies in a 
100. Id. § 11005. 
101. See id. 
102. See 7 U.S.C. § 197a(a)(1) (2012). 
103. Id. § 197a(a)(2). 
104. Id. § 197a(b)(1). 
105. For a discussion of choice-of-law provisions generally and the enforceability 
of choice-of-law provisions in the arbitration context specifically, see Ross Ball, FAA 
Preemption by Choice-of-Law Provisions: Enforceable or Unenforceable?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 
613, 613 (2006) (“Generally, choice-of-law provisions allow corporations that do 
business in several states or countries to draft their agreements and conduct their 
business in accordance with the law they choose. When the choice-of-law provision 
is contained in a contract that does not have an agreement to arbitrate, courts 
generally have no qualms about enforcing them. However, when the contract does 
contain an agreement to arbitrate, courts are reluctant to enforce the choice-of-law 
provision as to the arbitration agreement because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
governs arbitration agreements.”). 
106. 7 U.S.C. § 197b(a). 
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contract dispute, unless prohibited by the law of the state in which 
the principal part of the performance under the contract occurs.107 
Third and finally, with regard to arbitration, the 2008 Farm Bill 
granted producers and growers the right—to be exercised prior to 
entering the contract—to decline to be bound by a contractual 
provision requiring arbitration, should such a provision be present 
in a livestock or poultry contract.108 The Bill also required that such 
contracts conspicuously disclose the right to decline arbitration109 
and allowed a producer or grower to elect the use of arbitration, 
even if the producer or grower declined such use at the time the 
contract was formed.110  
While a review of the 2008 Farm Bill’s enactment does not 
appear to reveal great amounts of controversy regarding these 
additions,111 the debate surrounding, and the rejection of, other 
proposed Bill amendments demonstrate that sweeping reform to the 
PSA was not intended. For example, Tester amendment No. 3666 
would have expanded the scope of the PSA by preventing a packer 
from defending an unfair purchasing practices lawsuit on the 
grounds that its actions were based on a justified business decision.112 
Additionally, Grassley amendment No. 3823 would have created an 
Agricultural Competition task force to study problems in agricultural 
competition and generally increase oversight over agricultural 
mergers, transactions, and competition issues.113 
107. Id. § 197b(b). 
108. Id. § 197c(a). 
109. Id. § 197c(b). 
110. Id. § 197c(c). 
111. See 154 CONG. REC. 3801, 3811 (2008) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) 
(“[T]his bill is bipartisan because we worked together to give on both sides to make 
sure that we came up with a good farm bill that could command strong bipartisan 
support.”). 
 112. See 153 CONG. REC. 14406-01 (2007); see also 153 CONG. REC. 15390-01 
(2007) (statement of Sen. Roberts) (In opposition to the amendment: “This 
amendment will result in all producers being treated the same . . . regardless of how 
efficient or inefficient their operation may be and regardless of the quality of 
product they produce.”); id. (statement of Sen. Burr) (“I hope my colleagues here 
understand that the law, as currently written, works. It has served this country well 
and it has produced choice, it has produced quality, and it has fairly reimbursed all 
who entered into it. Let’s not change it, and let’s make sure the products that 
America has chosen and continues to choose in the marketplace are driven by the 
marketplace, not manipulated by this body in Washington.”). 
 113. 153 CONG. REC. 15078-02 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. 15433-01 (2007) 
(statement of Sen. Grassley) (discussing proposed amendment 3823); id. (statement 
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In sum, the 2008 Farm Bill made some small adjustments to the 
PSA, but the non-severity of these adjustments—along with the 
rejection of some more severe amendments—demonstrates that the 
Bill was not intended to bring sweeping reform to the Act or the way 
in which it was administered. 
B. The Administrative Rules Produced as a Result of the 2008 Farm Bill 
In addition to the amendments it made to the PSA itself, the 
2008 Farm Bill instructed USDA to promulgate specific rules to aid 
in the Act’s implementation.114 This Section discusses those 
instructions and USDA’s response thereto. 
1. The 2008 Farm Bill’s Narrow Direction to USDA
Section 11006 of the 2008 Farm Bill directed the Secretary of 
Agriculture to promulgate rules,115 no later than two years 
subsequent to the passage of the Bill, establishing criteria for the 
Secretary to use in determining: 
(1) whether an undue or unreasonable preference or 
advantage has occurred in violation of such Act; 
(2) whether a live poultry dealer has provided 
reasonable notice to poultry growers of any suspension of 
the delivery of birds under a poultry growing arrangement; 
(3) when a requirement of additional capital 
investments over the life of a poultry growing arrangement 
of Sen. Brownback) (In opposition to amendment 3823: “I believe the route to go 
is what we have been doing in the Packers and Stockyards Administration and 
having industry standards that are similar across all industries, and that we should 
support the Packers and Stockyards Administration, support the laws that are there, 
fund those entities—which I support doing—maintaining those standards but 
allowing these innovative approaches to take place for a major industry in my State 
and for my producers and cattle producers across the country.”). 
 114. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 11006, 
122 Stat. 923, 1358. 
 115. The promulgation of administrative rules is a common occurrence in 
which an executive agency writes and enacts rules pursuant to a congressional grant 
of rulemaking power. Informal, or “notice-and-comment,” rulemaking (which was 
utilized by USDA in the rulemakings noted in this article) requires publication of a 
notice of proposed rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), a period of time in which 
interested persons may provide comments on the proposed rule, § 553(c), and 
publication of the final rule not less than 30 days prior to its effective date, § 553(c). 
The informal rulemaking process does not include a hearing requirement. See 
generally United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
18
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss2/1
2017] AN EXPANSIVE LEAP: GIPSA’S ATTEMPT 363 
or swine production contract constitutes a violation of such 
Act; and 
(4) if a live poultry dealer or swine contractor has 
provided a reasonable period of time for a poultry grower 
or a swine production contract grower to remedy a breach 
of contract that could lead to termination of the poultry 
growing arrangement or swine production contract.116 
The Bill, via enactment of 7 U.S.C. § 197c, also directed the 
Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations related to the 
PSA’s newly codified provisions governing arbitration.117 
2. GIPSA’s Rulemaking Process in Response to the 2008 Farm Bill
On June 22, 2010, GIPSA, acting on behalf of the Secretary of 
Agriculture, published its proposed rules in the Federal Register and 
provided that GIPSA would consider comments received by August 
23, 2010.118 To the surprise of many, the proposed rules were 
expansive. For example, the proposed rules would attempt to 
reverse, by administrative fiat, decades of federal judicial precedent 
by eliminating the need for a claimant under 7 U.S.C. § 192(a) or 
(b) to demonstrate a competitive injury.119 The proposed rules also 
sought to impose capital investment recoupment requirements in 
grower contracts, modify the grower payment system, require 
vigorous recordkeeping requirements, and require disclosure and 
online publication of sample contracts.120 An analysis prepared for 
the National Pork Producers Association determined that the 
proposed regulations “would have limited farmers’ ability to sell 
animals, dictated the terms of private contracts, made it harder to 
get farm financing, raised consumer prices and reduced choices, 
stifled industry innovation,”121 and “cost the pork industry more than 
$330 million annually.”122 
116. § 11006, 122 Stat. at 1358. 
117. 7 U.S.C. § 197c(f) (2012); see supra Section III.A. 
118. Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food, 




121. NAT’L PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL, For the Week Ending April 22, 2016 (Apr. 
22, 2016), http://nppc.org/for-the-week-ending-april-22-2016/. 
 122. ‘GIPSA’ Rule Would Wipe Out TPP Benefits, Says NPPC, NAT’L PORK PRODUCERS
COUNCIL (May 26, 2016), nppc.org/gipsa-rule-would-wipe-out-tpp-benefits-says 
-nppc/. 
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GIPSA’s proposed rules were discussed extensively in a July 20, 
2010, hearing before the House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry.123 The general tone of the hearing 
was, mildly put, critical of GIPSA’s proposed rules.124 First, as a 
procedural matter, the Subcommittee was critical that GIPSA only 
provided a sixty-day comment period with regard to the proposed 
rules, as opposed to a longer comment period.125 Second, the 
Subcommittee expressed its opposition, as a matter of substance, to 
various items within the proposed rule, including the elimination of 
a need to demonstrate competitive harm under 7 U.S.C. § 192(a) or 
(b);126 the ban on packer-to-packer sales;127 the classification of a 
packer paying a premium or applying a discount on the purchase 
price received by a producer without substantiation as an unfair, 
unjust, discriminatory, or deceptive practice;128 and the requirement 
that grower contracts be for a duration that provides the producer 
with an opportunity to recoup up to eighty percent of his or her 
investment.129 The Subcommittee also expressed its displeasure that 
“[a] number of [the proposed GIPSA] provisions had previously 
been rejected . . . in the Senate process, and certainly in the [2008] 
 123. Hearing to Review Livestock and Related Programs at USDA in Advance of the 2012 
Farm Bill: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry of the H. Comm. 
Agric., 111th Cong. 2 (2010). 
 124. Id. at 3 (statement of Hon. David Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on 
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry) (“This proposed rule goes well beyond—well 
beyond—what Congress intended.”). 
 125. Id. (“You are given only 60 days for review and comment, which is clearly 
an inadequate amount of time. These are the most sweeping changes to the Packers 
and Stockyards Act in nearly 100 years, and GIPSA did little or nothing to get the 
input from the livestock and poultry industry.”). 
 126. Id. at 46–47 (statement of Rep. David P. Roe, Member, H. Subcomm. on 
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry). 
 127. Id. at 36–37, 40–41, 44–46 (statement of Rep. Jim Costa, Member, H. 
Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry; statement of Rep. K. Michael Conaway, 
Member, H. Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry; statement of Rep. Walt 
Minnick, Member, H. Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry; statement of Rep. 
David P. Roe, Member, H. Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry). 
 128. Id. at 54–55 (statement of Rep. Jim Costa, Member, H. Subcomm. on 
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry). 
129. Id. at 56–57. 
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farm bill.”130 The meeting resulted in an understanding that the 
GIPSA rules were in need of closer scrutiny.131 
On December 9, 2011, after receiving more than 61,000 
comments in response to the proposed rules, GIPSA published its 
final rules in the Federal Register.132 The final rules, which 
dramatically cut back on the proposed rules, only governed the 
general subjects of reasonable notice in the case of bird delivery 
suspension, contract requirements for additional capital 
investments, determining what constitutes a reasonable amount of 
time for remedying a breach of contract, and arbitration.133 Thus, 
the final rules, which went into effect February 7, 2012,134 addressed 
four of the five congressional directives in the Farm Bill.135 
3. The GIPSA Riders and the Newest GIPSA Rules
One of the reasons that some of the proposed GIPSA rules were 
not finalized in 2011, and remained that way, is that they were 
blocked by so-called “GIPSA riders,” which refer to provisions 
attached to annual agricultural funding bills that prevent finalization 
of the more controversial GIPSA rules.136 The first GIPSA rider was 
imposed shortly before USDA finalized the GIPSA rules via passage 
of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act—
 130. Id. at 1 (statement of Hon. David Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on 
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry). 
 131. See id. at 54 (discussion between Rep. Jim Costa, Member, H. Subcomm. on 
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry and Hon. Edward M. Avalos, Under Secretary, for 
Marketing and Regulatory Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.). Costa stated to Avalos, 
“Mr. Under Secretary, when you . . . go back to the shop at the USDA this afternoon, 
and if the Secretary happens to call you or look into your office and say, ‘How did 
it go, the hearing this afternoon,’ what would be your response?” Avalos replied, 
“Congressman, that is an easy answer. I would say, ‘Mr. Secretary, it was a 
tremendous lesson for me. Mr. Secretary, we need to continue and encourage 
comments and input on the proposed GIPSA rule.’” Id. 
 132. Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food, 
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008; Suspension of Delivery of Birds, Additional 
Capital Investment Criteria, Breach of Contract, and Arbitration, 76 Fed. Reg. 
76,874, 76,876 (Dec. 9, 2011) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. See supra Section III.B.1. 
136. See generally GREENE, supra note 12 (discussing the rulemaking history of 
GIPSA’s proposed rules and how subsequent GIPSA riders prevented enactment of 
certain aspects of those proposed rules). 
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the agricultural funding bill for fiscal year 2012.137 Similar GIPSA 
riders were imposed for fiscal years 2013,138 2014,139 and 2015.140 
However, there was no GIPSA rider attached to fiscal year 2016’s 
agricultural funding bill, thus leaving the door open for USDA to 
once again push the GIPSA rules proposed and rejected in 2010.141 
The USDA began walking through this open door in March 
2016 when the USDA Secretary, Thomas Vilsack, announced that the 
proposed GIPSA rules were being worked on and that USDA 
intended to move forward with certain elements of that proposal.142 
In October, 2016, new proposed rules were sent to the White House 
for review, and on December 20, 2016, GIPSA published proposed 
rules and one interim final rule in the Federal Register.143 
The interim final rule sets the groundwork for GIPSA’s newest 
rules and states: 
A finding that the challenged conduct or action adversely 
affects or is likely to adversely affect competition is not 
necessary in all cases [brought pursuant to sections 192(a) 
and/or (b) of the Act]. Certain conduct or action can be 
found to violate sections [192](a) and/or (b) of the Act 
without a finding of harm or likely harm to competition.144 
This language is ambiguous in that it does not explicate the 
types of conduct or action that could violate sections 192(a) and/or 
(b) of the PSA without a finding of competitive harm, and GIPSA 
purports to resolve this ambiguity through the proposed rules. 
The first part of the proposed rules (section 201.210) is 
structured as three paragraphs: paragraph (a) states that any 
conduct or action that the PSA explicitly deems to be “unfair,” 
“unjustly discriminatory,” or “deceptive” per se violates section 
 137. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. 
L. No. 112-55, 125 Stat. 552 (2011); GREENE, supra note 12, at 32. 
 138. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. 
No. 113-6, 127 Stat. 198; GREENE, supra note 12, at 32. 
 139. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5; 
GREENE, supra note 12, at 33. 
 140. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014); GREENE, supra note 12, at 34; 
 141. GIPSA Rule, NAT’L PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL, http://nppc.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2016/06/GIPSARule-003.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
142. See id. 
 143. Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration, 81 Fed. Reg. 
92,566–94, 92,703–40 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
144. Id. at 92,594. 
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192(a) of the Act;145 paragraph (b) provides a list of nine examples146 
of conduct or action that, absent demonstration of a legitimate 
business justification, violate section 192(a) of the Act, whether or 
not there is a showing of competitive harm; and paragraph (c) states 
that “any conduct or action that harms or is likely to harm 
competition” violates section 192(a) of the Act.147 The second part 
of the proposed rules (section 201.214) would add a tenth example 
to section 201.210(b) by amendment: failure to “use a poultry 
grower ranking system in a fair manner after applying” four specific 
criteria.148 The final part of the proposed rules (section 201.211) lists 
criteria that will be considered when determining whether there has 
been a violation of section 192(b) of the PSA.149 The last of these 
criteria is “[w]hether the conduct or action by a packer, swine 
contractor, or live poultry dealer harms or is likely to harm 
competition.”150 
145. Id. at 92,722. 
 146. These examples are: (1) retaliatory actions or threats of action “in response 
to lawful communication, association, or assertion of rights” by a producer or 
grower; (2) “conduct or action that limits or attempts to limit . . . the legal rights 
and remedies” of a producer or grower (e.g., the right to seek an award of attorney 
fees); (3) failure to comply with the requirements of 9 C.F.R. § 201.100 (dealing 
with records to be furnished to poultry growers and sellers); (4) failure to “provide 
reasonable notice to a poultry grower before suspending the delivery of birds, after 
applying” 9 C.F.R. § 201.215; (5) “requiring unreasonable additional capital 
investments from a poultry grower or swine production contract grower after 
applying” 9 C.F.R. § 201.216; (6) failure to “provide a reasonable period of time to 
remedy a breach of contract,” after applying 9 C.F.R. § 201.217; (7) failure to 
“provide a meaningful opportunity to participate” in arbitration, after applying 9 
C.F.R. § 201.218; (8) failure to “ensure accurate scales and weighing”; and (9) 
failure to “ensure the accuracy of . . . electronic evaluation systems and devices . . . .” 
Id. at 92,722–23. 
147. Id. at 92,723. 
148. Id. at 92,740. These four specific criteria are: (1) whether sufficient 
information has been provided to a grower in order to make informed decisions; 
(2) whether “inputs of comparable quality and quantity” are provided to all growers 
in a tournament ranking group; (3) whether “growers provided with dissimilar 
production variables” are included in a tournament ranking group in a manner that 
affects the grower’s compensation; and (4) whether the “dealer has demonstrated 
a legitimate business justification for use of a [tournament system] that may 
otherwise be unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive or [give] an undue or 
unreasonable preference or advantage . . . .” Id. 
149. Id. at 92,723. 
 150. Id. The other criteria set forth in § 201.211 are: (1) whether one or more 
producers or growers are treated more favorably than other similarly situated 
producers or growers “who have engaged in lawful communication, association, or 
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After a brief extension by the Trump administration, the 
comment period for the proposed rules closed on March 24, 2017.151 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, GIPSA must now publish a 
final rule in order for the proposed rules to become effective.152 The 
interim final rule, on the other hand, is scheduled to take effect on 
April 22, 2017, but its ultimate effectiveness appears to be uncertain 
at present.153 
IV. THE LEGAL ARGUMENT: WHY GIPSA’S NEWEST RULES ARE
WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION 
The preceding narrative sets up what is really at the heart of this 
article—that GIPSA’s newest rules are seriously flawed from at least 
three angles. Specifically, GIPSA’s rules are out of sync with the 
purpose of the PSA, the meat packing industry in light of the PSA’s 
purpose, and the federal judiciary and legislature. 
First, GIPSA’s newest rules are contrary to the purpose of the 
PSA because the PSA is, and was always meant to be, an antitrust 
statute. As discussed above, the PSA was enacted in response to 
specific conditions in the meat packing industry 100 years ago.154 
Specifically, a small number of packers controlled the market and 
utilized a number of anticompetitive and monopolistic practices to 
reduce prices paid to livestock producers and increase market prices 
assertion of their rights”; (2) whether one or more producers or growers are treated 
more favorably than other similarly situated producers or growers who are alleged, 
without a reasonable basis, to have violated any applicable law, rule, or regulation; 
(3) whether one or more producers or growers are treated more favorably than 
other similarly situated producers or growers “for an arbitrary reason unrelated to 
the livestock or poultry operation”; (4) whether one or more producers or growers 
are treated more favorably than other similarly situated producers or growers “on 
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, 
sexual orientation, or marital or family status”; and (5) “[w]hether the packer, . . . 
contractor, or . . . dealer has demonstrated a legitimate business justification for 
conduct or action that may otherwise constitute an undue or unreasonable 
preference or advantage.” Id. 
151. Poultry Grower Ranking Systems, 82 Fed. Reg. 9533–34 (Feb. 7, 2017). 
152. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
153. GIPSA has stated that it may alter the interim final rule based on comments 
it received thereon, 81 Fed. Reg. 92,570–71; 82 Fed. Reg. 9489 (Feb. 7, 2017), and 
many industry groups are currently advocating that the interim final rule be 
abandoned altogether. NPPC Asks USDA to Abandon GIPSA Rules, NAT’L PORK 
PRODUCERS COUNCIL (Mar. 24, 2017), http://nppc.org/nppc-asks-usda-to-abandon 
-gipsa-rules/. 
154. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text. 
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paid by consumers.155 The PSA was enacted to adapt the existing 
antitrust principals, as reflected in other statutes, to the unique 
practices in the livestock farming and meat packing industry.156 
Second, GIPSA’s newest rules are discordant with the meat 
packing industry in light of the PSA’s purpose. The PSA is an 
antitrust statute; thus, its general purpose is to regulate specific 
industry sectors in order to prevent monopolization within those 
sectors, which in turn benefits other industry players and 
consumers.157 However, monopolization cannot occur where 
barriers to entry are absent or negligible. Historically, the sector of 
the meat industry most susceptible to monopolization is meat 
packing.158 This industry requires large capital investments in 
facilities and equipment, a large source of available labor, and access 
to significant transportation infrastructure in order to efficiently 
operate.159 These needs pose a significant barrier to entry into this 
industry and thus make the meat packing industry susceptible to 
monopoly or oligopoly, as demonstrated by the history of such 
conditions within the industry. 
In contrast, monopolization is unlikely to occur at the grower 
level—the sector of the meat industry that GIPSA’s newest rules 
focus on—because the grower industry lacks significant barriers to 
entry. In comparison to the meat packing industry, the necessary 
investment and labor to operate a livestock barn is comparatively 
small. Thus, it is paradoxical to suggest that the PSA—an antitrust 
statute—is a proper avenue for regulation with regard to growers.  
Third and finally, GIPSA’s newest rules are incongruous with 
both the judicial and legislative branches of the federal government. 
The jurisprudential landscape surrounding the PSA has 
unwaveringly required a showing of competitive harm in order to 
demonstrate a violation of the Act’s ban on unfair or deceptive 
practices imposed by 7 U.S.C. § 192.160 In conjunction, the legislative 
history associated with the PSA’s ban on unfair or deceptive practices 
demonstrates Congress’s acquiescence and silent approval of section 
155. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
157. 7 U.S.C. § 192 (2012); see supra Section II.B; supra note 34 and 
accompanying text. 
158. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
159. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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192’s competitive harm requirement.161 For GIPSA—a facet of the 
executive branch—to now attempt to exercise its rulemaking 
authority to circumnavigate these actions for purposes of pursuing 
its own policy agendas cuts against the fundamental notions 
embraced by America’s longstanding separation-of-powers 
principles. After all: 
The regular distribution of power into distinct 
departments; the introduction of legislative balances and 
checks; the institution of courts composed of judges 
holding their offices during good behavior; the 
representation of the people in the legislature by deputies 
of their own election . . . . They are means, and powerful 
means, by which the excellences of republican government 
may be retained and its imperfections lessened or 
avoided.162 
In sum, GIPSA’s newest rules would completely sever the PSA 
from its antitrust roots and would instead transform the statute into 
an expansive, unlimited regulation by the federal government of 
routine commercial practices within the livestock industry. If 
approved, any breach of a contract in the livestock industry would be 
subject to potential regulation by the federal government. These 
issues, however, have historically been (and properly remain) the 
province of state law. Thus, the newest rules represent an unjustified 
and improper attempt by GIPSA to dramatically increase the scope 
of its regulatory power. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Like a myriad of other industries, the meat packing industry has 
changed with the times. What was once a disjunctive landscape of 
scattered growers and omnipotent packers is now a large, 
interconnected, and sophisticated system. However, one thing that 
has not changed throughout this paradigmatic shift is the PSA. At its 
start, the PSA was an antitrust statute, carefully crafted in light of its 
goal to foster competition. Throughout its life, the PSA has retained 
this purpose, despite numerous arguments raised to the contrary. 
Only time will tell whether GIPSA’s newest rules manage to alter 
the well-established landscape of the PSA. Undoubtedly, that period 
of time will be riddled with legal arguments, which may mirror those 
161. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
162. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 49 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898). 
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asserted by this article or raise entirely new arguments altogether. 
Above all else, however, one can only hope that the ultimate result 
serves to foster, rather than impede, the meat industry, which is 
surely one of the most important sectors in both the United States’ 
economy and society. 
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